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Abstract: This study replicates Schaeck, Čihák, and Wolfe (2009), henceforth SCW, and 
performs a variety of robustness checks. Using a cross-country, time series sample of 45 
countries from 1980-2005, SCW investigate the relationship between competition and 
concentration in the banking system, and the occurrence of country-level systemic crises. Their 
primary measure of competition in the banking industry is Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic. 
Concentration is measured using a concentration ratio of the three largest banks. They conclude 
that (i) competition and concentration measure two separate dimensions of the banking sector, 
and (ii) greater competition is associated with fewer systemic crises. Using data and code 
provided by the authors, we are able to exactly reproduce the original results of SCW. However, 
we find that their results are not generally robust. While we confirm their results on 
concentration, when we extend the data to the current period and use updated variable values, 
we find that competition, as measured by the H-statistic, is consistently insignificant across 
both duration and logit models. 
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This paper investigates key findings reported by Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe (2009), henceforth 
SCW, in their influential Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking article, “Are Competitive 
Banking Systems More Stable?”  Over the last twenty years there has been increasing interest 
in the relationship between conditions in the financial sector and country-level economic 
performance. Of particular interest is whether competition in the financial sector contributes, 
or inhibits, the likelihood that a country will be vulnerable to banking sector distress.  
 A key element in this literature is how one should measure “competition” in the banking 
sector. One measure that has been frequently used is the “concentration ratio”, measured by 
the proportion of assets held by a given number (usually three) of financial institutions. 
However, some studies have argued that this is an inadequate measure of competition 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004). A prominent alternative is the H-statistic, which uses bank level 
data to measure the ability of banks to pass on increases in input prices (Panzar and Rosse, 
1987). The greater the elasticity of banking revenues to input prices (i.e., the more negative), 
the less competitive the banking sector.  
 SCW analyse 38 “systemic crises” from a sample of 45 countries over the period 1980-
2005. They report evidence to support two conclusions. First, they find that the more 
competitive the banking sector, as measured by the H-statistic, the less likely it is to experience 
a “systemic crisis” (to be defined below). Second, they find that when the concentration ratio 
is included in an equation with the H-statistic variable, both are statistically significant. 
Increases in the concentration ratio are also associated with a lower probability of a systemic 
crisis. SCW consequently conclude that concentration ratio does not measure competition, but 
proxies for bank size. They speculate that larger banks may be better able to diversify risk, or 
more likely to receive government support, and thus better able to survive negative shocks.  
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 SCW is widely cited. At the time of this writing (November 2016), it had received 458 
Google Scholar cites, and 82 Web of Science citations. One reason for its wide influence is 
because the authors demonstrated that their results were robust to a wide variety of estimation 
and specification approaches. SCW use two different estimation procedures. They check for 
compositional robustness in the sample by altering the countries and time periods used in the 
analysis. They modify variable specifications to control for macroeconomic dynamics and 
banking sector development. They control for cross-country differences in regulatory 
environments. Throughout this battery of robustness checks, SCW consistently find that 
competition and concentration are both significantly and negatively associated with systemic 
crises. 
 Our replication of SCW proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we demonstrate that we can 
exactly reproduce the key findings in SCW. In Section 3, we use the same data as SCW but 
substitute two alternative measures of competition, the Lerner index (Fernandez de Guevara, 
2007; Maudos and Solis, 2011) and the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008). We find that the 
positive relationship between stability and competitive banking systems largely disappears 
when one uses these alternative measures.  
In Section 4, we investigate the effect of updating variables. We observe that there are 
substantial differences in the values of many of SCW’s variables when we compare the original 
data with currently available data from the same sources. We also observe substantial 
differences across data sources. Section 5 investigates the effect on SCW’s key results when 
the equations are re-estimated using updated data. A complication arises because the updated 
sample only imperfectly overlaps the original data. When we pare down the observations to 
include the intersection of the two samples, we find that the competition and concentration 
variables generally remain same-signed and statistically significant in both the original and 
updated subsamples. The only exceptions to statistical significance come when the sample sizes 
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are reduced less than a third of their original size. While the estimated effect sizes are same-
signed and of similar size, the associated standard errors are larger. This causes some of the 
estimates to become insignificant. 
Section 5 continues by exploring the following thought experiment:  Suppose SCW had 
undertaken their analysis in 2016. Would they have reached the same conclusion using the data 
that was available then?  We conclude that SCW would not have reached the same conclusion 
regarding competition, though they would have found similar results with regard to 
concentration. In particular, they would have found that greater concentration was negatively 
associated with systemic crises, but competition was consistently statistically insignificant. 
Section 8 summarizes our findings and applies the implications of our replication analysis to 
SCW’s conclusions. 
 
2. REPRODUCTION OF SCW’S KEY RESULTS 
The dependent variable in SCW’s analysis is “systemic crisis.”  This is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for a given country in a given year if any of the following four criteria hold 
(SCW, page 717): 
1. “emergency measures such as deposit freezes or bank holidays are implemented,” 
2. “large-scale bank nationalizations take place,”  
3. “nonperforming assets reach at least 10% of total assets,” or  
4. “fiscal cost of the rescue operations reach 2% of gross domestic product (GDP)”. 
 
The key explanatory variables are H-statistic and Concentration, described above, which 
measure competition and concentration in a country’s banking sector. The H-statistic takes the 
value 1 when the banking sector is characterized by competition. It takes values between 0 and 
1 when the sector is monopolistically competitive, and is negative in the case of monopoly. 




Two estimation procedures are used. SCW use duration analysis to measure the 
determinants of “time to failure”; that is, the number of years from the start of the sample until 
a systemic crisis occurs. If no systemic crisis occurs for a given country, the spell is treated as 
being right-censored. A variable that is positively associated with stability will have a positive 
coefficient in this analysis, as it will take longer for a systemic crisis to occur. SCW also 
estimate a logit model. A variable that positively contributes to stability will have a negative 
coefficient in this analysis, as an increase in this variable will be associated with a lower 
probability of a crisis occurring.  
SCW include a large number of control variables. To address macroeconomic 
determinants of financial stability, they include lagged GDP growth, inflation, the real interest 
rate, exchange rate depreciation, terms of trade, real credit growth, and a variable to measure 
“moral hazard” associated with generous deposit insurance. They include a set of dummy 
variables to control for legal origin of the country, as previous research has linked this to the 
contractual environment underlying the banking sector. Finally, a set of regional dummy 
variables are included as general controls for economic development.  
SCW’s main results are reported in Table 3 of their paper. The first four columns of 
Table 3 report various specifications of the duration model. Column (1) reports the results of 
estimating the model with control variables but no competition or concentration variables. 
Column (2) adds the competition variable (H-statistic). Column (3) adds the concentration 
variable to the specification in Column (2). Column (4) adds an interaction term for the 
competition and concentration variables to Column (3). Columns (5) through (8) do the same 
for the logit model. As SCW’s main conclusions focus on the coefficients of H-statistic and 
Concentration, we will focus our attention on Columns (2), (3), (6), and (7) in SCW’s Table 3. 
The first step in our replication study consists of reproducing SCW’s key results. As 
SCW graciously provided their data and Stata do files, this proved to be straightforward. 
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TABLE 1 reports the results of estimating the duration model using the variable specifications 
of Column (2) and (3) in SCW’s Table 3 with the data and do files they provided us. TABLE 
2 does the same for the logit models of Columns (6) and (7) in SCW’s Table 3. As both tables 
demonstrate, we are able to exactly reproduce their main findings. 
As SCW provide a discussion of the estimated coefficients of the respective control 
variables, we do not do that here. Instead, we focus on the competition and concentration 
variables. When the competition variable (H-statistic) stands alone, the duration model 
produces an estimate of 1.6977, which is significant at the 10 percent level. The positive 
coefficient indicates that greater competition in a country’s banking sector is associated with a 
longer time before a systemic crisis occurs. When both competition and concentration variables 
are included in the model, both coefficients are positive and statistically significant. The 
concentration variable is significant at the 1 percent level, while the competition variable 
increases to 2.3482 and is now significant at the 5 percent level. The fact that both H-statistic 
and Concentration are statistically significant lead SCW to conclude that these two variables 
“describe different characteristics of banking systems” (page 725), with the H-statistic 
capturing the effect of competition, and Concentration capturing advantages of being large-
sized. 
TABLE 2 repeats the replication exercise for the two logit models. When the 
competition variable stands alone, the associated coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. When the concentration variable is added to the specification, 
both competition and concentration variables achieve statistical significance at the 5 percent 
level. As a negative coefficient here implies a lower probability of a crisis, these estimates are 





3. ROBUSTNESS CHECK #1: Alternative Measures of Competition 
While Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic is a frequently used measured of competition, it 
is not the only one. Also widely used is the Lerner index. While the H-statistic measures the 
ability of firms to pass on input price increases to their customers, the Lerner index measures 
competition by estimating the ratio of the price of total assets over their marginal cost (Beck, 
De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez, 2007; Maudos 
and Solis, 2011). Increases in the Lerner index are associated with diminished competition. 
The Boone indicator measures the degree of competition based on profit-efficiency and is 
calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs (Boone, 2008; Duygun, Shaban, and 
Weyman-Jones, 2015; and Schaeck and Čihák, 2014). Like the Lerner index, larger (less 
negative) values of Boone indicate a less competitive industry. 
A list of papers that use the respective measures to measure competition in the banking 
sector is given below: 
- H-statistic: Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton (1994); Bikker and Haaf (2002); 
Claessens and Laeven (2004); Casu and Girardone (2006); Matthews, Murinde and Zhao 
(2007); Yeyati and Micco (2007); Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe (2009); Maudos and Solıs (2011); 
Schaeck and Čihák (2012); Weill (2013); Bolt and Humphrey (2015); Leon (2015). 
 
- Lerner index: Shaffer (1983); Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez (2007); Lopez and 
Saurina (2007); Schaeck and Čihák (2008); Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009); Beck, De 
Jonghe and Schepens (2013); Weill (2013); Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014); Love and Peria 
(2014); Mirzaei and Moore (2014); Bolt and Humphrey (2015); Diallo (2015); Jiménez, 
Kasman and Kasman (2015); Leon (2015). 
 
- Boone indicator: Schaeck and Čihák (2008); Schaeck and Čihák (2012); Love and Peria 
(2014); Mirzaei and Moore (2014); Schaeck and Čihák (2014); Diallo (2015); Duygun, Shaban 
and Weyman-Jones (2015); Kasman and Kasman (2015); Leon (2015). 
 
 To check for robustness across these alternative competition measures, we obtained 
Lerner index and Boone indicator values from the Global Financial Development Database 
(Čihák et al., 2012). We then substituted these variables for the H-statistic in the Column (2), 
(3), (6) and (7) specifications of TABLES 1 and 2. Everything else was held constant. We used 
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exactly the same observations, variables, and variable values for everything else in the 
respective models.  
 TABLE 3 summarizes the results of this robustness check, bringing together the results 
from the duration and logit models. We focus on the estimates of the competition and 
concentration coefficients, and do not report the estimated coefficients for the respective 
control variables. The top panel reproduces the estimates of the coefficients for H-statistic and 
Concentration from TABLES 1 and 2. The next two panels report the results of substituting 
the Lerner and Boone measures of competition. If the alternative measures for competition are 
to be consistent with the H-statistic estimates, the respective coefficients would need to be 
opposite signed, as increases in the Lerner and Boone variable are associated with decreased 
competition. In contrast, increases in the H-statistic are associated with greater competition.  
 TABLE 3 makes clear that SCW’s competition results are not robust across alternative 
measures of competition. Of the four Lerner estimates in the middle panel, only the coefficient 
in Column (3) is statistically significant. However, it is wrong-signed. The positive Lerner 
coefficient indicates that decreases in competition are associated with longer durations before 
a systemic crisis – the exact opposite to the conclusion from using H-statistic as a measure of 
competition.  
In contrast, the estimates using the Boone measure of competition are consistent in sign 
with the H-statistic results. However, all of the four estimates in the bottom panel of TABLE 
3 are statistically insignificant. Taken together, these results indicate the SCW’s conclusions 
rest entirely on H-statistic being the appropriate measure of competition in the banking sector. 






4. UPDATING THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
The next step in our robustness check consists of updating the values of the control variables 
to see if substituting updated values continues to give the same results. The Data Appendix in 
SCW identifies the sources they used for all the variables in their analysis. For example, SCW 
used the World Development Indicators to obtain values for GDP growth, inflation, and terms 
of trade. They used International Financial Statistics for depreciation.  
In this process, we found numerous, substantial differences between the original data 
series provided by SCW and the respective, updated data sources. FIGURE 1 gives some 
examples. The figure produces four screen shots of data that allow one to compare the original 
data with the updated data from the same source, as well as some additional data sources.  
For example, Panel A reports values for GDP growth (lag) for Indonesia for the years 
1980-2005. The source of these data is the World Development Indicator dataset (WDI), so 
that the first two columns (“Original” and “WDI”) allow a side-by-side comparison of the data 
used by SCW and the updated data from the same source. The last column presents values for 
lagged GDP growth as reported in the International Financial Statistics dataset (IFS), which 
allows a comparison from an alternative data source. 
 One immediately notes a large number of “missing values” in SCW’s dataset. However, 
these “missing values” should not be misinterpreted. In some cases they are missing from 
SCW’s dataset because SCW deleted observations during “crisis years.”  In their words (page 
717): “As most crises run over multiple years, we follow the approach in the literature 
(Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Detragiache 2002) and remove observations classified as crisis after the 
initial year of the crisis.” Our analysis follows the same practice. 
 The main takeaway from Panel A is that the original and updated data can differ greatly. 
For example, lagged GDP growth for Indonesia in 1980 is 1.63% in SCW’s original dataset, 
but 7.09% when we access currently reported values from the same source (WDI). When we 
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go to an alternative source, the IFS, we find a value (6.26%) that is different from both the 
original dataset and WDI, but is closer to the latter. Similarly, for 1981, SCW’s data has lagged 
GDP growth of -0.58%, with the updated WDI reporting a value of 8.72%, and IFS reporting 
9.88%.  
 Another example is given in Panel B, which reports inflation rates for Brazil from 1980-
2005. The first two columns of inflation data report values from SCW’s dataset and the updated 
values from the WDI, which is the source that SCW originally used for their data. The last two 
columns report values from alternative data sources -- IFS and DataMarket -- where in this case 
the latter values are identical to the WDI data. The original data are surely wrong, as Brazil 
was experiencing well-known hyperinflation in the 1980 and early 1990s. Panels C and D 
repeat the exercise for depreciation and terms of trade for Austria and Columbia, respectively. 
They provide further examples of substantial differences in values between the original and 
updated datasets.  
An interesting data scenario can be found in Panel C during the years 1999-2005.  This 
is an example where SCW’s original dataset contains values for variables for which 
corresponding values are unavailable at either the updated, same data source (in this case, IFS), 
or the alternative data sources (WDI and DataMarket). Interestingly, a noticeable shift in the 
original data series occurs after 1998 for Austria. Another thing to note from Panels C and D 
is that sometimes updated values are available from one data source but not another. For 
example, DataMarket does not have depreciation values for Austria for the years 1980-1991 
(cf. Panel C), while IFS and WDI do; and WDI does not have a value for terms of trade for 
Columbia in 1980, while DataMarket does. 
While FIGURE 1 is illuminating, its few examples do not allow a larger picture of the 
differences between the original and updated data. To do that, TABLE 4 reports descriptive 
statistics for the respective data sources using a common set of observations. We focus on 
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common observations because this ensures that any differences we observe are due to changes 
in variable values, and not because we are comparing observations from different countries 
and/or time periods. In this case, to be included in the table, the observation must have been 
used in the estimation of the Column (3) model, and are also available in the updated data. 
The top panel of TABLE 4 reports descriptive statistics for lagged GDP growth from 
three data sources: SCW’s original dataset, WDI, and IFS. An asterisk is placed next to WDI 
to indicate that this is the source cited by SCW for their data. The original data have a mean 
lagged growth rate of -0.197% over the 699 observations for which we have observations from 
all three data sources. For the exact same observations, the WDI and IFS data have a mean 
lagged growth rate of 3.556% and 3.679%, respectively.  
As the table demonstrates, similar differences are found for other variables. Where there 
are alternative data sources, these generally accord closely with each other, so that the original 
data is an outlier. This does not mean that SCW did anything wrong, as the data in their dataset 
may have been correct at the time it was collected. However, it does mean that using the 
updated data should give a more accurate measure of the true values of the control variables. 
The next section investigates whether these data differences impact SCW’s key findings about 
competition and concentration.  
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK #2: Reestimation of Models with Updated Data 
 
TABLE 5 reports the effects of estimating the Column (2), (3), (6) and (7) models using 
updated variable values. It carries on in spirit the same exercise of TABLE 4. Whereas TABLE 
4 calculated descriptive statistics for individual variables over a common set of observations, 
TABLE 5 requires observations for which the entire model can be estimated. Thus the original 
and updated datasets need to have a common set of observations not just for one variable, but 
for the full set of control variables. To be included in a “common set of observations,” an 
observation must both (i) have been used in the estimation of the original model in SCW (e.g., 
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Column 2 model, Column 3 model, etc.), and (ii) have available an updated value for each of 
the control variables. We continue to use SCW’s values for the competition and concentration 
variables. 
Our analysis constructs two sets of common observations. The first set (“Common 
Observations 1”) restricts itself to updated observations from the same data source as SCW. 
So, if SCW used WDI for lagged GDP growth, the updated dataset only takes lagged GDP 
growth values from WDI. The second set of common observations (“Common Observations 
2”) uses updated values from whatever data source will provide the most observations. So, for 
example, if, as in Panel D of FIGURE 1, SCW used WDI for terms of trade, but DataMarket 
has more total observations for terms of trade than WDI, then we take our updated values from 
DataMarket. 
The top panel of TABLE 5 (Panel A) investigates the effect of re-estimating the four 
key models from SCW using updated data from same sources. The top half of Panel A re-
reports the results of estimating the four models using the original data provided by SCW. The 
bottom half of that panel repeats the analysis, substituting updated values for the control 
variables. Whereas the original results reported by SCW used 701 observations for the duration 
models, and 707 observations for the logit models; when we restrict ourselves to observations 
that appeared in the original estimates and for which updated values from the same sources are 
available, the number of observations drops to 222 and 218, respectively. The fact that both 
halves of Panel A use the same observations ensures that any differences are due solely to 
updating the variables, and not due to differences in observations. 
The first takeaway from TABLE 5 is that SCW’s report of robustness across 
subsamples is largely confirmed. Turning first to the “Common Observations 2: Original Data” 
subsample in Panel B, both the H-Statistic and Concentration variables are statistically 
significant and have the same signs as they did in the full samples of 701 and 707 observations 
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(cf. top panel of TABLE 3). Thus, using SCW’s original data but restricting the analysis to 
observations for which updated values of the variables are available from multiple sources, we 
confirm SCW’s conclusion that competition and concentration are both negatively associated 
with systemic crises.  
When SCW’s original data is restricted yet further to observations for which updated 
values of the variables are drawn from the same sources (cf. “Common Observations 1: 
Original Data” in Panel A), the results are somewhat weakened. Of the six coefficients, only 
three remain statistically significant. However, the respective coefficients all have the “right” 
sign and are of similar absolute size to previous estimates. Statistical insignificance stems from 
the larger standard errors, which may reflect the much smaller sample sizes. Columns (2)/(3) 
and (6)/(7) in Panel A have sample sizes of 222 and 218 respectively, compared to 474/479 in 
Panel B.  
A similar finding is obtained when we replace SCW’s original data with updated values. 
Focusing on the bottom part of Panel B (“Common Observations 2: Updated Data – Multiple 
Sources”), we see that, again, H-statistic and Concentration have the same signs and 
approximate sizes as originally reported by SCW, despite using a restricted sample and updated 
values for the control variables – updated values that often are quite different from the original 
values (cf. TABLE 3). Of the six coefficients in that panel, four are statistically significant, 
with H-statistic being insignificant whenever it is paired with Concentration. When the number 
of observations is restricted to the 222 and 218 observations of the “Common Observations 1: 
Original Data” subsample, statistical significance evaporates across the board. So while the 
estimated coefficients remain “correctly signed,” and of similar size to previous estimates, the 




Our interpretation of the preceding analysis is that the use of updated values for the 
control variables, with concomitant decrease in the number of observations, generally confirms 
SCW’s original findings, except that their case is somewhat weakened because several of the 
variables do not achieve statistical significance. This latter result may be primarily driven by 
the fact that the smaller samples are inducing larger standard errors. 
TABLE 6 reports the last set of robustness checks. Conceptually, TABLE 6 addresses 
the question, suppose SCW had undertaken their analysis in 2016, using values and data 
sources that were currently available at that time. Would their analysis have led to the same 
conclusion as the original SCW study? 
TABLE 6 proceeds in steps. The first panel (Panel A) reports the results of using all 
possible observations when drawing data from the same sources as SCW over the same set of 
years (1980-2005). This analysis uses 327 observations for the duration models, and 331 for 
the logit models. The next panel (Panel B) expands the set of possible observations by drawing 
data from multiple data sources, choosing whichever data source (WDI, IFS, DataMarket, etc.) 
maximizes the sample size, while continuing to restrict itself to the years 1980-2005. The 
associated samples sizes are 679 ad 682 for the duration and logit models, respectively.  
The next three panels extend the years of analysis to the most recent available, so that 
the period of analysis covers the years 1980-2014. Panel C draws data from the same sources 
as SCW. Panel D uses multiple data sources. And Panel E updates not only the control 
variables, but also the H-statistic and Concentration variables. In this sense, Panel E comes 
closest to addressing the question, would SCW’s conclusions been different had they 
undertaken their analysis in 2016, rather than in 2008 when their paper was accepted at the 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.1 
                                                 
1 SCW’s paper was first submitted to the JMCB in January 2006; and accepted in August 2008. 
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On the basis of Panel E, we conclude that SCW would not have reached the same 
conclusion they reported in their original manuscript. While the variable Concentration is 
negatively associated with systemic crises, as in the original study, the competition measure 
H-statistic is both smaller in size and statistically insignificant in both the duration and logit 
models.  
In fact, this is a consistent finding across all five panels in TABLE 6. In each and every 
case, the estimated coefficient for H-statistic is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, unlike 
TABLE 5, statistical insignificance cannot be blamed on small sample sizes, as the sample 




Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe (2009), henceforth SCW, ask whether “competitive banking 
systems are more stable” in their influential Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking study. They 
summarize their findings as follows (SCW, page 711): 
Using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as a measure of competition in 45 
countries, we find that more competitive banking systems are less prone to 
experience a systemic crisis and exhibit increased time to crisis. This result 
holds even when we control for banking system concentration, which is 
associated with higher probability of a crisis and shorter time to crisis. Our 
results indicate that competition and concentration capture different 
characteristics of banking systems, meaning that concentration is an 
inappropriate proxy for competition. The findings suggest that policies 
promoting competition among banks, if well executed, have the potential to 
improve systemic stability. 
 
Our replication examines a number of features of their study to determine whether their results 
are sufficiently robust to support the policy conclusion that greater competition promotes 
stability in the banking sector. We interpret our results as indicating that they are not. 
 We base our interpretation on two results. First, replacing the competition measure H-
statistic with either of two alternative measures of competition – the Lerner index and Boone 
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indicator -- causes SCW’s competition estimates to generally become statistically insignificant. 
It may be that the Lerner index and Boone indicators are inferior measures of competition in 
the banking sector, so that this lack of robustness need not definitively weigh against SCW’s 
conclusion. But it is worth noting that their results crucially hang on the superiority of the H-
statistic. 
 Second, and more importantly, SCW would not have reached the same conclusion as 
their original study if they had undertaken their analysis in 2016, rather than 2008. The 
combination of updated variable values and additional crisis episodes would have caused them 
to reach a substantively different conclusion. While concentration appears to be negatively 
associated with systemic crises, competition, as measured by the H-statistic, is consistently 
insignificant across both duration and logit models. As a result, they would not have been able 
to conclude that competition was positively associated with banking stability, at least not as 
measured by the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. 
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Replication of Key Duration Models with Authors’ Data 
 
Variable 
Column (2) Column (3) 
Original Replication Original Replication 






(0.0377)     
Inflation -0.1693 (0.3200) 
-0.1693 




(0.3457)        
Real interest rate -0.0251** (0.0121) 





(0.0114)        
Depreciation 0.0533* (0.0275) 
0.0533* 




(0.0289)         
Terms of trade -0.3126*** (0.0697) 
-0.3126***   




(0.0746)        
Credit growth -0.0008** (0.0004) 
-0.0008** 




(0.0003)       
Moral hazard index -0.4363** (0.1785) 
-0.4363** 




(0.2279)        
German legal origin -0.5967 (1.0905) 
-0.5967  




(1.0288)        
French legal origin -1.0421** (0.4511) 
-1.0421** 
(0.4511)       
-1.3532*** 
(0.3887) 
-1.3532***    
(0.3887)     
Scandinavian legal origin 0.6542 (1.0942) 
0.6542 




(1.1386)       
Africa dummy -1.5102** (0.6586) 
-1.5102**    
(0.6586)     
-1.8586*** 
(0.6682) 
  -1.8586*** 
(0.6682)        
Other dummy -1.1901* (0.6368) 
-1.1901*    




(0.6481)        
Latin America dummy -0.5069 (0.7557) 
-0.5069 




(0.6853)        
H-statistic 1.6977* (0.8804) 
1.6977* 




(0.9700)       
Concentration ---- ---- 3.0834*** (0.9595) 
3.0834*** 
(0.9595)        




NOTE: This table reports the replication of Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 in SCW (page 722). 
The data for the replication were provided by SCW, as were the Stata do files used to produce 
the replications. Estimates are derived from a duration model that assumes that survival times 
are exponentially distributed. Survival times are measured in years as time to a systemic crisis. 
The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, 
clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 





Replication of Key Logit Models with Authors’ Data 
 
Variable 
Column (6) Column (7) 
Original Replication Original Replication 


































































































Concentration ---- ---- -3.4672** (1.4747) 
-3.4672** 
(1.4747) 
Observations 707 707 707 707 
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NOTE: This table reports the replication of Columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 in SCW (page 722). 
The data for the replication were provided by SCW, as were the Stata do files used to produce 
the replications. Estimates come from maximum likelihood estimation of a logit model, where 
the dependent variable takes the value 1 if there has been a systemic crisis for that country in 
that year, and 0 otherwise. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster 
robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-





Replication of Key Models Using Alternative Competition Variables 
 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
Original Data 
H-statistic 1.6977* (0.8804)         
2.3482** 





Concentration ---- 3.0834*** (0.9595)        ---- 
-3.4672** 
(1.4747) 
Observations 701 701 707 707 
Replacing H-Statistic with Lerner 







Concentration ---- 3.5171*** (0.9505) ---- 
-3.7882** 
(1.6727) 
Observations 701 701 707 707 
Replacing H-Statistic with Boone 







Concentration ---- 2.6709** (1.1211) ---- 
-2.9291* 
(1.7057) 
Observations 701 701 707 707 
 
NOTE: The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the 
models in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722). Only the competition 
and concentration coefficients are reported. The top panel reproduces the estimates from 
TABLES 1 and 2. The remaining two panels use the identical set of observations, so that the 
only difference across panels for a given specification is that a different competition variable 
has been used (Lerner or Boone instead of H-statistic). The numbers in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, 






Descriptive Statistics for Original and Updated Data (Common Observations) 
 
Variable Data Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth (lag) 
Original 699 -0.197 3.731 -17.333 25.572 
WDI* 699 3.556 3.399 -13.128 21.829 
IFS 699 3.679 3.797 -8.857 52.554 
Inflation 
Original 691 1.854 1.166 -4.257 6.439 
WDI* 691 15.085 45.013 -0.929 625.802 
IFS 691 15.169 44.896 -4.410 620.840 
DataMarket 691 15.085 45.013 -0.929 625.802 
Depreciation 
Original 332 2.835 2.546 -4.760 8.868 
IFS* 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
WDI 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
DataMarket 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
Terms of trade 
Original 404 4.626 0.197 3.931 5.305 
WDI* 404 0.312 10.945 -46.653 67.797 
DataMarket 404 1.409 15.754 -63.605 169.845 
Real interest rate† 
Original 591 2.159 16.931 -312.233 41.110 
WDI 591 7.231 9.505 -35.078 76.428 
DataMarket 591 7.225 9.505 -35.078 76.428 
Credit growth† 
Original 698 108.092 282.845 -811.882 3393.340 
WDI 698 15.887 93.366 -1605.175 541.081 
GDD 698 15.759 93.416 -1605.175 541.081 
Moral hazard index† 
Original 544 1.664 0.259 0.000 1.940 
DID 544 0.289 2.774 -11.862 4.618 
 
NOTE: The values in the table allow comparison of descriptive statistics across data sources 
for key variables in SCW’s analysis. “Original” refers to the data provided by SCW. The other 
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data sources are World Development Indicators (“WDI”), International Financial Statistics 
(“IFS”), Global Financial Development Database (“GDD”), Deposit Insurance Database 
(“DID”) and DataMarket. For each variable, we selected the maximum number of observations 
for which data were available for all data sources listed for that variable. This insured that 
differences were due solely to different values across data sources, and not because different 
observations were used to calculate the descriptive statistics. An asterisk indicates that the 
respective data source was used by SCW. 
 
† We did not use SCW’s datasources for these three variables when it came time for updating. 
The reasons are given below. 
 
Real interest rate. SCW state that they sourced real interest rate data from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). They state that real interest rates were calculated as “nominal 
interest rate minus the rate of inflation”. However, IFS reports various interest rates and 
inflation rates. The available interest rates are Central Bank policy rate, money market rate, 
Treasury bill rate, deposit rate, lending rate and government bond rates. Inflation rate data 
are available for both the consumer price index and the GDP deflator. Not knowing the 
exact series that SCW used to calculate their real interest data, we instead used the variables 
identified as “real interest rate” in WDI and DataMarket for the purposes of updating. 
 
Credit growth. Credit growth is based on the amount of domestic credit loaned to the private 
sector. SCW used IFS data in their paper. However, these data are not currently available 
from IFS. Therefore, we used domestic credit to private sector data from the WDI and GDD 
databases when updating. 
 
Moral hazard index. SCW obtained data for their moral hazard index from Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache’s (2002) Deposit Insurance Database.  These data were updated by 
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2014), and we draw from this latter source when 





Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data/Common Observations 
 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
A. COMMON OBSERVATIONS 1 
Original Data 
H-statistic 2.7960** (1.2908)         
1.9825 





Concentration ---- 5.7003 (3.9084)        ---- 
-4.3380 
(4.0548) 
Observations 222 222 218 218 
Updated Data – Same Sources 
H-statistic 3.9171 (3.1742)         
 
3.3610 






Concentration ---- 3.9562 (2.6326)   ---- 
-4.3421 
(3.1285) 
Observations 222 222 218 218 
B. COMMON OBSERVATIONS 2 
Original Data 
H-statistic 2.5688** (1.1370)         
2.6843** 





Concentration ---- 4.8737* (2.6118)        ---- 
-5.3242** 
(2.5415) 
Observations 474 474 479 479 
Updated Data – Multiple Sources 







Concentration ---- 4.4773*** (1.5671) ---- 
-4.9514*** 
(1.5722) 




NOTE: The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the 
models in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722 and 723). Only the 
competition and concentration coefficients are reported. All datasets used in the table consist 
of subsamples of the observations used to estimate the original specifications in SCW. The 
table consists of two panels. The top panel updates variable values using the same data sources 
as SCW. The bottom panel expands the number of data sources, choosing the one that 
maximizes the number of observations available for estimation. Each panel (A and B) consists 
of two parts. Both parts within a panel use the identical set of observations. The only difference 
is the top part uses SCW’s original data, while the bottom part of the panel uses updated values 
of the control variables. Note that there are variables values that are available in SCW’s original 
dataset, for which updated values are not available; and variables for which current values are 
available, but for which values are missing in SCW’s original dataset. For this reason, the 
number of observations in each panel is less than the original number of observations used by 
SCW. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard 
errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 






Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data/Maximum Observations 
 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
A. SAME SOURCES (1980-2005) 







Concentration - 4.4016** (1.8738) - 
-4.3776** 
(1.9312) 
Observations 327 327 331 331 
B. MULTIPLE SOURCES (1980-2005) 







Concentration - 4.6350*** (1.4047) - 
-4.9581*** 
(1.5413) 
Observations 679 679 682 682 
C. SAME SOURCES (1980-2014) 







Concentration - 3.3357** (1.5215) - 
-3.4130* 
(1.8728) 
Observations 506 506 497 497 
D. MULTIPLE SOURCES (1980-2014) 







Concentration - 4.4240*** (1.2262) - 
-4.6509*** 
(1.3697) 
Observations 851 851 846 846 
E. MULTIPLE SOURCES + UPDATED H-STATISTIC  
AND CONCENTRATION (1980-2014) 







Concentration - 4.0230*** (1.2677) - 
-4.3229** 
(1.7700) 




NOTE: The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the 
models in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722). Only the competition 
and concentration coefficients are reported. Panels A and B are identical to Panels A and B in 
Table 5, except that all available observations are used, even if the observations were not 
included in SCW’s original analysis. Panels C and D repeat the analysis of Panels A and B 
except that the sample periods are extended to the most recently available data (2014). Panel E 
is identical to Panel D, except that the values for the competition and concentration variables 
are also updated, whereas the previous panels used the values originally used by SCW. The 
numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, 
clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
 
Global Financial Development Database provides H-statistic data from year 2010 onwards. 




Comparison of Selected Data Values from Alternative Sources 
 













NOTE: The values in the table allow comparison of variable values across data sources for selected variables, countries, and years. “Original” 
refers to the data provided by SCW. The other data sources are World Development Indicators (“WDI”), and International Financial Statistics 
(“IFS”). An asterisk indicates that the respective data source was used by SCW. 
 
